【明報專訊】上星期發生了很多大事。首先，是美國在星期二舉行中期選舉。這是一個里程碑，因為它標誌着美國人對政府應該在多大程度上干預經濟出現觀感上的轉變。當然，在重要的財政和貨幣刺激政策方面，無可避免地，會有一些見多識廣的人表示不同意。一方面，有人會說，再增加政府開支只會弄巧反拙，因為它會引致結構性的經濟增長率更低，走向類似日本的局面。
上星期，美國民眾表達了對這問題上的意見——十分反對再增加政府開支。隨着共和黨在眾議院改選中取得多達239席，該黨控制的眾議院將會和奧巴馬針鋒相對。
很多勝出的參議員都提出保守的財政政策——認為美國國會的當務之急，是要恢復喬治布殊時代的減稅行動，以及盡量通過立法來削減開支至接近2008年的水平。奧巴馬會否簽署這樣的法案？還是會否決法案，拒絕兩黨合作？若是後者，會否引發未來兩年出現總統和國會對立的政治僵局？
總統國會對立 減危機處理力
總統和國會可能出現對立的政治僵局，加上美國兩黨之間針鋒相對的情况正處於歷史新高，這可能會大幅削弱美國處理危機的能力。在2008年，當白宮主人仍是共和黨人（喬治布殊），而國會則由民主黨控制時，當時的美國財政部長保爾森可要懇求民主黨籍的眾議院議長佩諾茜，才能令救助銀行的方案獲國會通過。
不用多說，這對恢復市場信心，沒有什麼幫助。相比之下，今年5月，歐洲主權債務危機惡化，歐盟和國際貨幣基金組織（IMF）在相對短的時間內推出了合作拯救希臘的方案。
經過上周二的改選之後，若將來又有一個歐洲國家的主權債務危機惡化，美國國會有多大機會通過撥款支持IMF的救助行動？又或者，房利美和房貸美有多大機會取得另一筆2000億美元的撥款（盛傳兩者急需這筆撥款；在部分右派人士的眼中，房利美和房貸美恍似是民主黨的金主。）？無可否認，新的權力分配帶來了一些不確定因素，對於頻臨破產的希臘或兩房都會是壞消息。
環球金融海嘯其中一個令人吃驚的特點，就是它能夠對不同國家的金融制度產生不同的影響。在澳洲、加拿大、韓國、法國和瑞典等經濟合作及發展組織（OECD）成員國，房地產市場原先是預料會崩潰。但當金融海嘯突然發生時，它們的房地產市場只是微跌了些少，即重新上升。而當地的銀行也在沒有多少政府幫助的情形下，安然渡過危機。
海嘯之源：政客伙銀行騎劫監管者
但在另一些OECD成員國，如西班牙，其房地產市場就真的全面崩潰，雖然其大型私營銀行仍然倖存下來。在愛爾蘭、美國和英國等其他OECD成員國，房地產市場大跌，引發了多家銀行倒閉。比利時、荷蘭和德國避開了樓市大起大落，但它們仍然有相當大比例的本土銀行出現問題（如Fortis、IKB、Hypo RE等）。
各國的表現不盡相同，是因為一個簡單的原因──在某些國家，貨幣和監管當局相信，只要將風險「拆散打包賣出」，它就會漸漸化於無形（不幸地，我們也曾覺得這方法甚為吸引）。在這些國家，由來已久的審慎理財原則遭唾棄，商業銀行和投資銀行需分開經營的原則雖曾經歷時間考驗也被拋掉，銀行的資產負債表的槓桿比例膨脹至30倍、40倍，甚至50倍。
以救就業之名 操控匯率利率
出現這種情形，是因為監管當局被政客和一些大得不能倒閉（too-big-to-fail）的銀行聯手騎劫了。前者為求選票，後者為求利，結果是那些聲稱懂得有效管理風險的人，用巨大的槓桿大舉扭曲了資產的價格（特別是住宅樓宇）。現時的麻煩是，當日引致危機的同一批人，今日卻向我們表示，他們有權操控匯率、短期利率和長期利率，以降低失業率。
一個有效的法定貨幣制度需要有三大支柱：
一、一家獨立的中央銀行，而這家中央銀行不需以貨幣手段來融資政府的預算赤字；
二、在整個經濟周期內，政府的預算赤字都需要在控制之內；
三、私營但有良好監管的銀行體系。
在2008年至2009年，在某些國家，這三大支柱確實倒塌了，尤以英國和美國最為明顯。令我們震驚的是，美國聯儲局不但沒有嘗試修復這三大支柱，它看來反而想測試一下「始料不及政策後果的定律」！
投機的熱錢早已湧入歐元、亞洲的房地產、商品、貴金屬等，很快就會令能源和食品價格大升，抵消了低利率的刺激經濟作用；順帶一問，有誰真的相信QE2將會令已經接近歷史低位的按揭利率再大幅降低？
我們一定要希望，美國聯儲局主席伯南克在本質上跟隨「尼克遜政策」──瘋狂至市場真的相信他任何事也可以辦得到。在1970年代，前美國總統尼克遜曾經下令轟炸柬埔寨，以震懾北越，從而迫使後者在談判桌上讓步。現在，伯南克說服了市場，他會竭盡全力防止通縮出現──愈來愈多迹象顯示，他已達到這個目標，但願這意味着我們很快就可以停止那些廢話──利用貨幣貶值，來創造價值和經濟增長；以零成本融資的零回報的投資；操控最重要的價格（美元和長期利率），以控制未來投資的價值。
Pierre Gave
GaveKal 亞洲區研究部主管
Last week was a very big week. First, on November 2nd, we saw the US midterm elections. This was a very important landmark, because it marked a shift in the perception of to what extent the government should interfere in the economy.
Of course, it is inevitable for reasonable and well-informed people to disagree on the very important issues of optimum fiscal and monetary stimulus. One the one hand, one could argue that the recent increase in government spending is self-defeating as it leads to a lower structural growth rate and a Japanese style scenario.
Last week, the American public chimed in with their view on the subject—one that is very much against any further increases in spending. With the Republicans having gained as much as 64 seats, the new Republican-controlled House is on a direct collision course with President Obama. Many of the winners ran on an agenda of fiscal conservatism: one of the House’s first order of business will be to renew the Bush tax cuts and pass legislation to cut spending to as close to 2008 levels as possible. Will President Obama sign such a bill? Or veto and dispel any notion of bipartisan cooperation? If the latter, will this unleash a two-year period of confrontation and political gridlock?
The prospect of gridlock in Washington, combined with the all-time high acrimony between the two US political parties, is likely to diminish drastically the US system’s ability to deal with crises. In 2008, when power was divided between a Republican White House and a Democratic Congress, the US Treasury Secretary had to literally get on his knees to plead with Nancy Pelosi to approve a bank bailout. Needless to say, this did little for confidence. Meanwhile, back in May of this year, the worsening European sovereign debt crisis led to an EU-IMF bailout of Greece in relatively short order. However, after yesterday’s election, what will be the odds that the US Congress will approve the funding of the next IMF bailout of a European (or any other) sovereign? Or for that matter, what are the chances that Fannie or Freddie (which some on the right see as Democratic Party patronage machines) get the next US$200bn they are rumored to need to survive? Undeniably, the new division of power brings with it some uncertainty… which could be tough news for those who, like Greece or the US GSE, are teetering on the brink.
With the benefit of hindsight, one of the more amazing features of the Global Financial Crisis is how differently it impacted the various local financial systems. In OECD countries such as Australia, Canada, Korea, France and Sweden, real estate markets were roaring in the lead-up to the meltdown. When the crisis struck, property markets skipped a beat or two, but then continued their advance, and local banks survived with little, if any, government help (it is a novel experience for us to experience a crisis and not see Korean banks blow up!). Some OECD countries such as Spain did experience a full-blown real estate meltdown, though the large private sector banks survived. Other OECD countries, most notably Ireland but also the US and the UK, experienced real estate busts which triggered implosions in the banking systems. Belgium, Holland and to some extent Germany avoided the real estate boom and bust, but nevertheless experienced a meltdown of epic proportions in the local banks (Fortis, IKB, Hypo RE etc…)
Behind this divergence in performance lies a simple fact: in some countries, local monetary and regulatory authorities bought into the belief that if risk was sliced and diced enough times, it could essentially disappear (unfortunately, we too found the notion compelling). Age-old prudential rules were thrown out of the window, the time-tested separation of commercial and investment banks was dismantled, and bank balance sheets were allowed to become 30x, 40x or even 50x geared. This occurred thanks to the capture of regulators by an unholy alliance of politicians and too-big-to-fail banks, the first ones buying votes, the second ones making a fortune. But in the end, those who claimed that they knew how to manage risks more efficiently than our fathers introduced massive distortions in the price of assets which could be bought on leverage (mostly housing).
What is troubling today, is that the same people who brought us the previous crisis are now telling us that they are entitled to manipulate the exchange rates, the short rates and long interest rates in the worthy goal of achieving a fall in the unemployment rate.
A functional fiat monetary system rests on three pillars: 1) an independent central bank which does not monetize budget deficits, 2) a budget deficit which stays under control over the course of a cycle, and 3) a privately owned, well-regulated banking system. These three pillars crumbled in 2008-2009 in a number of countries but most visibly in the UK and the US. To our dismay, rather than trying to repair these broken pillars, the Fed seems intent on testing the law of unintended consequences. Already speculative flows are overwhelming the Euro, real assets in Asia, commodities, precious metals, etc., and it may not be long before rising energy and food prices dampen any stimulus achieved by lower real rates (by the way, does anyone really believe that QE2 will significantly reduce mortgage rates that are already close to record lows?).
We have to hope that Ben Bernanke is, in essence, following a sort of “Nixon policy”, i.e., act so crazy that the markets actually think that you are capable of anything. In the 1970s, Nixon bombed Cambodia in a bid to scare the Vietnamese into more concessions at the bargaining table (not so nice if you were Cambodian). Today, Bernanke has convinced the market that he will go to any length to prevent deflation from taking root…with increasing signs that he has now achieved this goal, it will hopefully mean we can soon stop this nonsense of trying to create value and growth by debasing the currency, financing at no cost expenditures that have no return, and manipulating the most important prices (the US$ and long rates) for determining the value of future investments.
