【明報專訊】當上周中國宣布再提高銀行的存款準備金比率0.5個百分點時，市場都將之視為中國決心為經濟降溫的另一信號。但當11月份的一連串經濟數據公布後──貨幣供應按年增長19.5%，消費物價指數（CPI）上升5.1%，工業生產增長13.3%，全部都超出預測，那緊縮的計劃看來相當脆弱。
中國政府透過多次提高銀行的存款準備金比率，已經在銀行體系中凍結了18.5%的存款（小銀行為16.5%），比2007至2008年度的17.5%還要高。但是，當年也曾4度加息，結果消費物價指數還是升破了5%。
這一次中國政府似乎想盡量避免加息，儘管通脹的威脅很明顯，中國只曾在10月加息一次。為甚麼中國人民銀行這麼努力的避免提高借貸成本？估計可能是因為以下的原因：
三大原因 令中國不願意加息
一、與西方國家的「狂印銀紙」劃清界線。其中一個解釋是，中國政府擔心，加息會吸引到更多熱錢流入。因為現時中國和經濟合作與發展組織（OECD）成員國的息差，已經比以往幾個經濟周期為大。
換句話說，中國歸咎西方「印銀紙」（濫發貨幣），造成它的通脹問題，因此不想其貨幣升值或者息差擴闊，以免投機者得益。
二、不惜一切，為了經濟增長。中國人民銀行不願意加息，也拒絕讓人民幣加速升值，可能是總理溫家寶的認沽期權仍發揮作用。這意味著，不惜任何代價來維持經濟增長，仍然是溫總理的指導原則。以往這種態度，曾經令中國的貨幣政策跟不上形勢。
若真的是這樣的話，短期內將會看到資產泡沫；明年則會看到災難性的通脹，令經濟硬著陸。至於長期影響，則是再一次延遲推行結構性的改革。而且，由於人口結構變化，通脹已不單只是周期性的問題。中國不願意或者無能力處理通脹問題，將會對其經濟產生長遠和破壞性的影響。
三、中國領導人有理由相信通脹只是短暫現象？以貨幣供應M1的增長和通脹的典型關係（圖）來說，通脹應會在未來幾個月下降。但當然，只看以往的相互關係並不安全。特別是，現時正處於歷史上很少有的情形──全球大多數國家的政策利率都處於歷史低位。
行政層面出手 治樓措施蓄勢待發
或許中國現時正準備在行政層面推出一些大動作——特別是，可能推出新一輪的遏抑樓市措施（如徵收房產稅，進一步收緊地產發展商的信貸額等等）。畢竟，中國政府近期已將其保障房的目標，由2010年的580萬間（已經比2009年的280萬間增長了一倍），提高至2011年的1000萬間。
但若地產商仍然是拿著一大堆鈔票來投地的話，中央政府可能得不到地方政府配合推行保障房計劃。若中央政府計劃對地產商展開新一輪的打壓，它可能會避免同一時間加息──這就有如經濟合作與發展組織（OECD）成員國避免同時削減財赤，以及推行緊縮的貨幣政策一樣。
下一輪復蘇 新興國恐跑輸歐美
總結來說，我們有以下的結論：
一、由於中國緊縮經濟的速度還是不夠快，中國經濟將會過熱，貨幣將會升值。
二、通脹率即將達到頂點，讓中國保持在稍為收緊的路線。但這仍然有很多不確定的因素。這正是為何在下一輪經濟復蘇中，新興市場的表現可能會遜色於美國和其他發達國家。
展望將來，再調高銀行的存款準備金比率，作用已不大，因為那主要是限制熱錢進一步流入，而非「掃蕩」銀行體系內現有的流動資金。
經過兩年的寬鬆貨幣政策，現時限制貨幣增長的關鍵是收緊信貸。中央經濟工作會議的政策制定者早前重申了中共中央政治局的聲明，貨幣政策將會由「適度寬鬆」調整為「穩健」，並補充說，要優先穩定整體物價水平。
會議沒有為信貸增長及貨幣增長定下特別的目標，但若要控制通脹，收緊信貸額和加息都是需要的。此外，會議的政策制定者表示，會更加關注收窄貧富懸殊，因為最受物價上升打擊的，就是低收入的一群。
再調高準備金率 作用已不大
房地產市場方面，儘管已推出多種緊縮措施，樓宇的售價和銷售額仍維持在高水平。今年11月份，內地的樓價按月上升的年率達到3.6%，這已是連續兩個月出現按月上升。
今年11月份的樓宇銷售額按年上升15%，與9月和10月的16%至17%相若。而11月份的住宅樓宇貸款亦達到1900億元人民幣，明顯高於10月份的1660億元人民幣。換言之，9月底推出的新一批措施已明顯失敗，未能令樓市降溫。
期待已久（或擔憂已久的）的房產稅現時應該在認真考慮中。若你是中國的房地產發展商，明年將會是充滿挑戰的一年。
Pierre Gave
GaveKal亞洲區研究部主管
When announced last week, China's decision to raise the required reserve ratio by a further +50 basis points could have been interpreted as yet another sign of Beijing's determination to cool the economy. But after a fresh batch of eye-brow raising data-YoY money supply growth at +19.5%, CPI at +5.1%, IP at +13.3% in November (all above expectations)-the tightening program looks quite delicate. China has tied up 18.5% of deposits in banking system (a lesser 16.5% for the small banks) with a series of hikes in the required reserve ratio; this exceeds the 17.5% RRR reached in 2007/08. However, back then, interest rates were also raised four times before CPI broke 5% (see chart p. 2). This time around the authorities have avoided the interest rate tool, with only one rate hike (in October) despite pretty clear inflation threats. So what are the possible reasons that the PBoC is trying so hard to avoid raising the cost of borrowing?
1) Battle lines drawn with the West's easy-money binge? One explanation is that China is concerned about hot money flows, since the interest rate differential with the OECD is now greater than in past cycles. In other words, China blames the West's easy-money policies for its inflation problems, and will thus not want to reward speculators with currency appreciation and tempting yield differentials.
2) Growth at all costs is back? The PBoC's reluctance to raise rates and refusal to let the currency appreciate faster may be a sign the WJB put is still on. This would mean that growth-at-any-cost remains the guiding rule-an attitude in the past which has led to monetary policy being behind the curve. If so, then we will see an asset bubble on the short-term (stocks rose this morning) and a CPI disaster, leading to a severe crackdown/hard-landing next year. The longer-term implication would be that necessary structural reforms will once again be delayed. Moreover, inflation is no longer only a cyclical question, due to changing demographics. China's unwillingness and/or inability to deal with inflation would have a lasting damaging effect on the health of the economy.
3) China's leaders have reason to believe CPI will roll over? Based on the typical relationship between M1 growth and inflation, CPI should be moving down (see chart) over the next couple of months. Of course, it is not safe to rely just on past correlations, especially in such a singular period in history with most of the world's policy rates at record low levels. But perhaps China is currently preparing to roll out some big moves on the administrative side-in particular, another round of austerity is likely planned for the property sector, one that really zaps the developers (e.g., implementation of a property tax, further tightening on credit to developers, etc.). After all, we know Beijing recently increased its social housing target to 10mn units in 2011, up from and 5.8mn in 2009, which was already double the 2.8mn units in 2009. But Beijing will not be able to get local governments to go along with this scheme if developers are waving fistfuls of money in their faces, saying-"hey, give us the land instead." If Beijing is planning another crackdown on developers, it might be wary of hiking rates at the same time-just as the OECD central banks are wary of combining fiscal restraint with tighter monetary policy.
Ultimately, what we have here is the prospect that 1) China is not tightening fast enough, its economy will overheat as a result, and a monetary backlash will follow, or 2) inflation is about to peak, allowing China to remain on a moderately tighter path. And while we put our money on option 2, there is undoubtedly a lot of uncertainty. This is another reason why emerging markets are likely to underperform the US and other developed markets in the next stage of the recovery.
Looking ahead, Further RRR hikes, which are largely aimed at sterilizing capital inflows rather than mopping up existing liquidity in the banking system, will make little difference. After two years of monetary blowout, the key to constraining money growth is tighter credit control. Policy makers at the Central Economic Work Conference, which sets the broad outline of economic policy for the coming year, repeated the Politburo's earlier announcement that monetary policy would shift from "relatively loose" to "prudent" in 11, and added that "stabilizing overall price levels" would be a priority. No specific targets were given for credit and money growth, but tighter credit quotas and higher benchmark interest rates are both needed to keep inflation in check. In addition, policy makers said they would attach more importance to "narrowing the widening income gap" amid concerns that low-income groups are being hit hardest by rising prices.
Looking at the real estate market, despite various tightening measures, property sales and prices remain at high levels. House prices rebounded for the second consecutive month to 3.6% in Nov on an annualized m-o-m basis. Property sales rose 15% yoy in Nov, roughly the same as the 16-17% recorded in Sep-Oct. The new restrictive property measures issued in late Sep has clearly failed to cool the housing market, which benefited from a rebound in household loans to Rmb190 bn in Nov (up from Rmb166 bn in Oct). The long-awaited (or long-feared, depending on whom you talk to) property tax should now be under serious consideration. Next year will certainly be a challenging year if you are a Chinese property developer....
