【明報專訊】最近的20個集團（G20）財長會議後，我們感到在貨幣戰的問題上中美有所緩和，美國財政部暫緩向國會提交貨幣操控報告，讓其可暫毋須向中國採取行動，北京方面不單表達了未來幾年會降低經常帳盈餘佔GDP的比重，更重要的是進行加息，顯示已啟動了改革的進程。中美之對弈，一方欲水浸全球，另一方則說放馬過來，我們會統統買下多餘的美元，並印發更多的人民幣，有時這場對抗會演變成全面的貿易保護戰，照我看來情况已有所改善。
中美互動 美方在量化或須讓步
1. 雙方各自讓一步：美方給予中方一點政治空間，首先美國財政部運用把戲，暫不指控中國為貨幣操控國，G20的聯合聲明（主要由美財長蓋特納主催）支持經常帳盈餘目標，後者早在兩周前中國已在其他渠道提出，美方這點讓步無疑給了中方「面子」，總的來說，不可能把一個盈餘目標應用到所有國家，它們都處於不同的發展階段，發展中國家理應有貿易赤字（以購科技，興建基建等），並維持本幣的穩定，處於不同發展階段的國家亦應有不同的儲蓄率，若強求每個國家的國際收支都要平衡，將有違200年前經濟學家李嘉度所提出的比較優勢論。因此，我們不會對G20的原則性建議信以為真，這不過是向中國示好的姿態而已。
2. 儘管北京在匯率問題上讓步有限：若然如北京最近提出以4年時間把其經常性盈餘佔GDP比重降至4％以下（即回到2004年水平），假設名義GDP增長每年仍達11％，則貿盈仍會擴大1000億美元，即到了2014年，中國的經常性盈餘會達4000億美元，較2007年的高峰還要高，相當於2004年的6倍；換言之，中國仍需要大量的海外需求，若果美國的貿赤同期內收縮，則中美以外的其他國家便有很大的壓力要增加進口，因此，中國政府也可能會覺得漸進式糾正貿盈對各方都有好處。
3. 但中國確開展了長期的結構改革工程：中國過往不惜代價追求增長的思維，也可稱為「溫家寶經濟保底期權」，確實增加國際貿易的失衡，除非中國開始進行結構改革，否則拉動GDP中的消費部分是難以達至的，這些改革包括較現實的資金成本，才能達至下一階段提升生產力的目的，在現時經濟增長放緩及處於不明朗的時刻，內地仍願意加息，反映其願為長期的宏觀經濟得益，忍受短期的痛苦。
在近期的研究中，我們提出再沽空美元，風險日高，理由有二，國會中期選舉後，美元可能大升，在選舉翌日召開的聯儲局公開市場委員會會議未必會大規模進行二次量化寬鬆。若中國願在貨幣戰爭中退讓一點，則美方將會量化寬鬆的戰線上會有很大壓力須輕一點。
長債孳息商品價均已上揚
此外，也不純是中國令聯儲局應重新思考二次量化寬鬆，自從8月伯南克在Jackson Hole全球央行大會上提出要向經濟注入新資金後，情勢確起了變化，經驗告訴我，聯儲局是按四大因素決定政策的：
（1）長債孳息：伯南克在Jackson Hole 發表演說時，長債孳息不斷下滑，聯儲局在貨幣政策上確有必要鬆一點，但現時已不同了。
（2）商品價格過去8星期也由跌轉升了。
（3）美國失業率仍是高企，並會繼續是聯儲局的焦點，但一些聯儲局要員如Fisher 、Lacker等近期公開質疑貨幣政策在現况下能否改善就業。
（4）銀行信貸，目前仍甚疲弱，聯儲局並無收緊政策的空間。
在發表Jackson Hole演說，上述四個變數都指向應該進一步放寬貨幣政策，但今時今日，形勢變得較為中性了。
若聯儲局在二次量化寬鬆的決定上令市場大失所望，會否觸發長債息率暴漲呢？因為之前大家入市買國債是基於會有下一個傻瓜接貨，令國債愈買愈貴？又或是會觸發債息暴瀉，因為二次量化不到位，市場重燃雙底衰退的憂慮？近期的市場走勢令我相信第一種情况會較可能，這也令聯儲局須再三思是否要進取地進行二次量化寬鬆。
風險胃納回升 毋須那麼寬鬆
况且，所有信號均指向風險胃納回升：
．過去10天，瑞士法郎（避風港貨幣）是除了巴西雷阿爾外表現最疲弱的貨幣，後者的弱勢是因為當地實施資本進出限制。
．企業盈利強勁，已公布第3季業績的美國企業佔了全數的一半，盈利勝過市場預期又佔當中的78％，這令投資者的風險胃納大增。
．企業回購股份的公布令更多資金流入股市，國際商業機器（IBM）就宣布了百億美元的回購計劃。
總結而言，聯儲局在議論二次量化時，很難不受以下四種因素所影響：一是不俗的經濟數據，二是強勁的企業盈利，三是商品價格強勁，四是債息上揚，由於大多數的投資者都部署了更多的量化寬鬆措施，美元進一步走弱，一旦聯儲局採取謹慎的策略，則國際金融市場本周將會十分動盪。
Pierre Gave
GaveKal亞洲區研究部主管
Going into this last weekend's G-20 meeting, there was a feeling that we had come to at least a short-term détente between the US and China on this currency-war issue. The US Treasury had somehow managed to slip out of its legal obligation to act on the "China as currency manipulator" question by Oct. 15th, and Beijing had not only articulated a goal to lower its current account surplus in the next several years, but perhaps more importantly last week it raised interest rates, a nod towards structural economic reform. Obviously the big showdown is between the US and China: one threatens to flood the world with Dollars while the other says-sure, hit us, we'll just buy them up and print more RMB. At times, this stand-off has threatened to spill over into a full-blown trade-protectionist showdown. In my view, the situation now looks a bit better:
1. Each side is giving a little: The US at the very least is striving to give China some political breathing space here. First, the US Treasury acrobatics to avoid "currency manipulator" status. And then yesterday, the G20 communiqué (and Geithner in particular) is seemingly endorsing the idea of a CA surplus goal, an idea that China raised only two weeks ago. What else could this be about other than giving some "face" to China. After all, there is really no economic rationale to applying such a rule across the globe! Countries in different stages of development will never have the same dynamics-developing countries often require trade deficits to get started (to buy technology, build infrastructure, etc.), and also have legitimate reasons to maintain what China likes to call "currency stability." We also know that countries at different stages of development have very different savings rates, and logically so. The idea that every country should strive towards a current account equilibrium flies in the face of everything we have learned about comparative advantages since it was first raised by Ricardo 200 years ago. As such, we have a hard time taking this broad suggestion seriously, other than as a gesture of goodwill towards China.
2. Though Beijing is not giving THAT much on the exchange rate: If, as Beijing recently proposed, it takes the country about four years to get the current account surplus back down below 4% of GDP (where it last was in 2004), then assuming nominal GDP growth of +11%, a further $100bn will actually be added to the surplus. That brings it to US$400bn by 2014, higher than the peak level of 2007 and six times the level of 2004. In other words, China will still be demanding a lot of excess demand from the rest of the world. If, at the same time, the US current account deficit shrinks, this would put some serious pressure on the rest of the world to step up. Thus, Chinese policy makers probably feel that a gradual approach is in everyone's interest.
3. But China is putting the wheels in motion for long-term structural reform: China's "growth-at-any-cost" mentality, which we like to call "the Wen Jiabao Put", has undoubtedly added to global imbalances. China will not be able to grow the consumption component of its GDP pie unless it lays the groundwork with some structural changes-including a more realistic cost of capital-that will lead to the next stage of productivity enhancement. Raising interest rates at the current uncertain juncture, and amid slowing growth momentum, shows a determination to take some short-term pain in return for longer-term macroeconomic gain.
In recent research we have laid out two key reasons why we think US$ short positions are getting increasingly dangerous: the possibility of a post-election related rally in the US, plus the possibility that the FOMC meeting on the day after the election will prove not as dilutive, in QE2 terms, as expected. If China is going to give a little in this "currency war," then it seems the US will be under more pressure to cool it on the QE front.
Incidentally, this is not the only reason for the Fed to potentially rethink their position -the environment has changed since Bernanke made his call for more liquidity inducing provisions in his speech at Jackson Hole in August. Indeed, in my experience, the Fed tends to follow closely four key variables in making policy decisions:
1. Long bond yields. Eight weeks ago, when Bernanke made his Jackson Hole speech, these were falling thereby justifying a dovish Fed. This is no longer the case.
2. Commodities were also falling eight weeks ago, but have since rallied.
3. Unemployment...is undeniably very high and clearly remains the focus of the Fed, though interestingly, a number of directors (Fisher, Lacker...) have recently come out to question whether monetary policy could do much to help unemployment at the current juncture.
4. Bank loans...are still too far too weak to trigger any tightening measures.
So at the time of his Jackson Hole speech, four out of four drivers seemed to be pointing towards an easier Fed policy. Today, however, the overall picture is far more neutral. Which in turn begs an important question: if the Fed 'disappoints' in terms of QE2, will long-dated bond yields spike up on the basis that the 'greater fool' who was going to buy that most overvalued of assets is actually not going to show up at the party? Or will bond yields collapse on the basis that an absence of QE2 will trigger a double-dip recession? Recent market movements seem to be indicating that the first reaction would be more likely which, in itself, should push the Fed to question the logic of an aggressive QE2.
This is all the more true since all signs are pointing towards a renewed rebound in risk appetites. Consider the following:
· In the past ten days, the Swiss Franc (the ultimate 'safe haven' currency) has been the weakest performer other than Brazil (which is aided by new capital controls-see p. 2).
· Strong corporate earnings (with half the S&P 500 having filed 3Q earnings, 78% have seen upside surprises) are clearly triggering greater risk appetites amongst investors.
· Impressive announcements on share buy-backs (i.e., IBM's US$10bn) are likely to push more liquidity into the stock market.
Summing it up, it is hard for me to believe that the Fed will not be intrigued by a) decent economic data, b) strong corporate profits, c) strong commodities, and d) the rise in bond yields. And because most investors are positioned for more Fed action and a weaker dollar, we could be in for a rocky week if the Fed adopts a more cautious approach.
